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INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT ENJOINED.
The recent case of Beekman 7,. Marsters, reported 8o N. E.
817, and decided by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, uphelcl
an injunction granted to restrain the defendant from acting under
a contract which he had obtained by inducing the breach of a con-
tract between a third party and the plaintiff. A hotel company
had made the plaintiff an exclusive agent for it in a certain sec-
tion, and the defendant afterwards induced the hotel company to
appoint him an agent also. The plaintiff, on showing unlawful
interference with his contract by the defendant and that damages
would not afford him an adequate remedy, was entitled to an
injunction.
That inducing the breach of a contract is actionable seems to
be a sound principle. A person entering into a contract with
another, has, flowing from that contract, legal rights. Is it law-
ful for another to interfere with those legal rights? Undoubtedly
many judges have thought and held that inducing a breach of
contract by means of persuasion was not actionable, and most
cases holding such acts unlawful have strong dissenting opinions.
Vegelahn v. Gunter, z67 Mass., 192.
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But conceding the right to sue a person wrongfully inducing
the breach of a contract, it would seem that, some special ground
for equitable jurisdiction existing, an injunction ought to issue to
protect the legal right. Such ground for equitable jurisdiction
might be irreparable injury, as in acts of trespass, or the fact that
the remedy at law for damages was inadequate. Pickett v.
Walsh, 192 Mass., 572.
The case of Pacific Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 50 Fed. 493 is worthy of notice in this connection. The
plaintiff company was granted an exclusive right of way along a
railroad to conduct a telegraph system. The defendant corpora-
tion prepared to put in a telegraph line to compete with the
plaintiff and an injunction was sought against the former. Here
there was no allegation of the defendants inducing the breach of
the plaintiff's contract, but knowing of the existence thereof, and
attempting to build a rival line, certainly amounted to a viola-
tion of plaintiff's contract. It is true in this case, that an in-
junction was deniedi, but this is easily to be accounted for on
grounds other than those of a denial of the right. When a per-
son seeks equitable relief there are many influences of an equit-
able nature which affect the chancellor. In this case, the plain-
tiff's contract was held not only ultra vires but also against public
policy. Such a case can hardly be an authority denying the right
as recognized in the principal case.
On the other hand, in the case of Western Union Telegraph Co.
v. Rogers and the Baltimore and Ohio Telegraph Co., 42 N. J. E.
31T, the right to an injunction under circumstances similar to
those in the principal case is recognized and with reasoning clear
and convincing. Rogers owned a hotel and gave the complain-
ant an exclusive privilege to operate a telegraph office. Rogers
afterwards entered into a contract with the Baltimore and Ohio
Telegraph Co. extending to them a like privilege. The com-
plainant sought to enjoin the latter from exercising this privilege.
The defense was "adequate remedy at law." The court said the
position that this court of equity ought to allow parties to violate
their agreements and send the injured party to law was not ten-
able. As further supporting the granting of the injunction, the
vice-chancellor said that adequate damages could not be obtained
at law. There was no way of estimating damages at law, as the
value of one office only depended on the number of connections
that office had. "Irreparable injury simply means a grievous in-jury, not adequately reparable by damages at law. By inade-
quacy of the remedy at law is meant that the damages obtainable
at law are not such a compensation as will in effect, though not in
specie, place the parties in the position in which they formerly
stood." Kerr on Injunctions 200. "The mere circumstances of the
breach of contract may afford sufficient ground for the court to
interfere by injunction." 3 Toyce on In/. 75.
It is everywhere conceded that the remedy by injunction is
being extended. Equity takes cognizance of many actions now
that formerly could not have arisen. It may perhaps be doubted
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if in the earliest days of chancery jurisdiction, the chancellor
would have thought it possible to enjoin the defendant in the
main case. But the advantage of this remedy is certainly a suf-
ficient reason for its application in Beekman v. Marsters.
LEVY ON PROPERTY IN DEBTOR'S HANDS.
The recently decided case of Richards v. Heger, 99 S. W. 802,
holds that an officer acting under and by virtue of a writ of exe-
cution does not commit a trespass in seizing money in the hands
of the execution debtor while he is engaged in counting it. The
action is one brought by the latter to recover the money. It
seems plaintiff had the sum of $450.oo due from an insurance
company. Payment of such was made in the company's office by
tossing to him a package of bills with the statement that it was
his and to count it. Proceeding to do so, the defendant, a con-
stable, came up behind him, grabbed the money out of his hands,
said, "I levy on this," and then read the writ under which he
acted. The court in passing opinion relied most strongly on the
case of Green v. Palmer, 15 Cal. 411 and State v. Dillard, 3 Iredell's
Law (N. C.) 102; and these, together with an extract from Free-
man on Executions,constitute the only authorities cited in support
of the conclusion reached. The argument of the court is em-
braced in the following: "The seizure of property attached to the
person of a defendant would be a trespass against his person as it
would tend to provoke a breach of the peace, but to seize his
property found in his possession, not pertaining to his wearing
apparel, nor worn or carried on his person for use or as an orna-
ment, would not be an indignity against his person nor, under
ordinary circumstances, a trespass. The circumstances of the
seizure in question were no more likely to provoke a breach of
the peace, and possess no more of the elements of a trespass, than
an entry by the officer on the premises of the defendant in the
execution and the seizure there, in his presence, of his personal
effects. against his will and over his protest. Either act would be
a trespass but for the acts and powers with which the officer is
clothed by law for the purpose of writs of execution. He commits
a trespass when he seizes and levies upon the defendant's property
exempt from execution, or when to make a levy he commits un-
lawful violence against his person; but to take a bridle rein, by
which defendant is leading his horse, from his hand, or a bag of
gold. or a package of currency he is holding in his hand, is not
committing violence against his person, and in our opinion is not
a trespass." This is all the. court has to say on the subject, sub-
stantially a mere declaration of the conclusion. It is to be
regretted that more consideration was not given to a legal analy-
sis of the situation as the precedence upon which it relies appear
indefensible on the basis of theory or policy. State v. Dilliard
was the seizure under execution of a horse on which the owner was
riding. It was held legal. But a horse does not partake so much of
the nature of property which is on the person as money and articles
of clothing or adornment. The relation between it and its owner
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is not so intimate nor would there be such a feeling of natural
sanctity relative to it. This decision is not nearly the extreme
case as the present and can hardly be said to be an authority for
it. The quotation from Freeman on Executions is to the effect that
the California case of Green v. Palmer (supra) "seems to establish
the proposition that money in the hands of the debtor may be
seized under execution" but then goes on to doubt the logic of
such a rule. So the real and only foundation for the present de-
cision is the case of Green v. Palmer. There are no equivocal cir-
cumstances or phraseology connected with this case. It holds
that the seizure under execution of a bag of gold in the hands of
the debtor is justifiable. However, the decision is unusual and the
courts of sister states should feel much hesitancy in following it
unless, by sound reasoning, it can be vindicated.
At one time the idea obtained in England that money was not
subject to execution, and the quaint even if fallacious reason
given was that nothing was so subject except it could be sold and
the inherent nature of money negatived that notion. Lord Mans-
field in Armistead v. Phiotlt, Doug. 23!. But it is superfluous to
say that the rule is no longer adhered to either there or in this
country. Marshall, C. J. in Turner v. Fendall, x Cranch 117. In
this connection Lord Coke said, speaking of what was the subject
of distress, "Although it may be of valuable property, as a horse,
etc., yet when a man or a woman is riding on him, or an axe in a
man's hand cutting off wood or the like, they are for that time
privileged, and cannot be distrained." Co. Lit. 47, a. But there
is a distinction between distress and levy under execution inasmuch
as the former is the act of the party himself and the latter that of
an officer of the law. The reasons assigned, if not of equal
potency in the two cases, nevertheless have strong bearing on the
question we are at present considering.
The rule of universal prevalence is that property on the person
is exempt from levy. In ilolmes v. Nuncomb, 12 Johns. (N. Y.)
395, the constable was present when money was paid to a person
against whom he held a writ of execution. The latter handed it
to the officer asking him whether in his opinion it was counterfeit,
and it was immediately levied on by him. This was held to be a
valid levy. In another case a levy was made by an officer on a
watch which has been handed to him for purposes of comparison
with his own. A small cord encircling the owner's neck had to
be broken in separating it from him. This was held to be a tres-
pass. Mack v. Parks, 8 Gray 517. A later Massachusetts case
holds that a valuable breast pin, though worn with the avowed
object of precluding its being seized under legal process, could
not be so taken while on the owner's person. Maxham v Day,
x6 Gray 213. In a Tennessee case, it was held that a levy on
blacksmith's tools while in use by him was invalid, there being no
statute on the subject. The case is very meagerly reported in
I. Yerger 397.
The basic reason underlying all these decisions is that the
seizure of property on the person is so provocative of resistance
COMMENT
by the owner that the policy of the law forbids it. Why does
that not apply to the seizure of money in the hands? That is
undeniably as invitatory of a personal encounter as the seizure of
a breast pin worn on a scarf. The opinion in State v. Dilliard,
holding that a horse being ridden by its owner could be levied
upon, assigns as a reason that it is the duty of the person to sur-
render his property to legal process as much in the case of where
he is using it as where it is merely in his sight or presence. No
distinction can be drawn on the duty theory. Is it not as much
the duty of the party to surrender a valuable breast pin worn by
him as it is to surrender his horse which perchance is to him a
means of livelihood? Is it not as much the duty of a person to
surrender money in his pocket as it is money in his hand? Yet
it can be indisputably asserted that no court would sustain a levy
on the former. It is on his person in one case as much as in the
other, and in both the incentive to personal conflict concerning
which the law is so solicitous, is present in a high degree. The
propriety of the rule laid down in the California and Missouri
cases can well be doubted.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. MARRIAGE CONTRACT.
The Supreme Court of the United States rendered a decision
April x5 th, in Travers v. Reinhardt, which is interesting as a mod-
ern construction of common law marriage. The case was tried
on an appeal from the Court of Appeals of the District of Colum-
bia, 25 App. D. C. 567. The litigation arose in construing a will,
and the validity of the marriage of James Travers became material
in determining whether his wife would take under a provision of
the will. In the opinion, the following facts were in substance
conceded to be established. In x865 a marriage between James
Travers and Sophia V. Grayson was performed in Alexandria,
Va., by a friend of Travers who in fact was not a person author-
ized by statute to perform such a ceremony. The woman believed
it was a real marriage. After this ceremony the woman assumed
the name of Mrs. Travers. They thereafter lived in Maryland
till x883 as husband and wife. A few months prior to Traver's
death they had resided in New Jersey. During all the eighteen
years of their cohabitation they had continued the relation of hus-
band and wife in every way, and were so considered and respected
in the communities in which they lived. Abundant evidencesuch
as deeds, an unattested will and the last will of Travers showed
that they considered themselves as husband and wife. The situ-
ation was briefly this: Following the Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals construction of the Virginia statute, the marriage in
Virginia was void. The statute, requiring every marriage to be
under license and solemnized in manner prescribed, was con-
sidered mandatory and not directory and it thus abrogated the
common law. Cohabitation for over fifteen years in Maryland
did not establish a legal relation of husband and wife, for the
Maryland Court of Appeals had held that in that state there can-
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not be a valid marriage without a religious ceremony. The short
residence in New Jersey prior to Traver's death was the means
of giving their cohabitation recognition as a legal relation of mar-
riage. New Jersey recognizes the comman law principle of mar-
riage, and from the continued cohabitation of this couple an
agreement lper verba de traesenti was implied, and the court held
the marriage valid in law, so the wife was entitled to take under
the provisions of the will in controversy.The general rule that marriage is valid or void by the
law of the place where it is celebrated is valid or void every-
where, is very familiar. It has been held in New Jersey
that when a man and a woman intend to marry and live together
as husband and wife but their intent is frustrated by the
existence of some unknown impediment, when the impediment is
removed and it is shown that the same intent continues, their re-
lations are lawful. Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 62 Atl. 68o. Most
states by statute prescribe the formalities which are required to
constitute a valid marriage in their respective territories. In
construing these statutes the courts consider that marriage is a
right which existed before statute and that the relation was en-
couraged at common law. So where statutes give requirements
unless the statutes also expressly deny validity to marriage not
in conformity thereto, such a statute will be construed as directory
and not mandatory. Maryland v. Baldwin, I 12 U. S. 49
o
. Hey-
man v. Heyman, 218 Ill. 636. Bishopo on Mar. & .Div. Sec. 283.
Speaking of statutes, the court, in Meister v. Moore, 96 U. S.
76, says: "In many states, enactments exist very similar to the
Michigan statute, but their object has manifestly been not to
declare what shall be requisite to the validity of the marriage but
to provide a legitimate mode of solemnizing it." The state alone
has the right to regulate marriage within its boundaries.
Travers v. Reinhardt presents a novel situation made possible
by the diversity of marriage requirements in the different states.
The lack of uniformity in our marriage laws has for a long time
been a source of confusion and continues a problem for legislation
yet unsolved.
